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Abstract
We develop a model which formahzes a problem posed by Keynes
(1940): how to optimally share the burden of deficit finance among
heterogeneous agents who have differential access to inside investment
opportunities. In the presence of private information, it is Pareto eflli-
cient for the government to borrow in a way that amounts to non-linear
taxation, and it must treat agents with access to the best investment
opportunities preferentially to keep them in the bond market. With
private information about access to assets, this can often best be done
by extraneously randomizing the return on the highest yielding gov-
ernment liabilities. The optimal government policy is shown to accord
well with historical observations.
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1 Introduction
There has been increasing recent interest in trying to understand why gov-
ernments finance deficits in the way they do. Our purpose in this paper is to
provide a model that can simultaneously explain the following observations:^
(i) governments often issue an array of liabilities in different denominations
and bearing different rates of return;^
(ii) intermediation of government (and other) liabilities is often restricted;
(iii) individuals hold diversified portfolios consisting of large denomination
government bonds and divisible inside liabilities;
(iv) governments with large deficits often extraneously randomize returns on
some bonds, and simultaneously issue other bonds with certain returns;
(v) some groups of agents face liquidity constraints while others do not.
In addition, our analysis bears on a problem posed in detail by Keynes (1940):
How might the burden of the debt (in this case caused by World War II) be
shared optimally among heterogeneous agents, some of whom have access
to investments that are not available to all? We show that under plausible
conditions, the answer to Keynes' question is a government borrowing scheme
with all of the characteristics described above.
Interest in these issues has, of course, not been confined to the present
paper. Bryant and Wallace (1984), for instance, show how a government
needing to finance a deficit can improve welfare by issuing large denomina-
tion indivisible bonds and imposing legal restrictions on intermediation. This
policy permits the government to employ non-linear taxation and has the im-
plication that at an optimum all agents perceive themselves to be liquidity
^There is also a growing literature which employs considerations of time consistency to
explain various aspects of government borrowing [e.g., Lucas and Stokey (1983), Persson,
Persson, and Svensson (1987), and Chari and Kehoe (1990)]. However, we confine attention
to explaining the following observations, which we believe can best be understood in
contexts where government commitment is possible.
"Specifically, some liabilities are issued in large denominations and are indivisible.
constrained."' Villamil (1988) extends this analysis by incorporating het-
erogeneity and private information, and shows that a government behaving
optimally will issue as many liabilities as there are agent types, with each lia-
bility bearing a different rate of return. Moreover, in her model only a subset
of the agents face liquidity constraints.^ However, neither model predicts the
presence of non-trivially diversified individual portfolios [cf.. Hoover (1988)
or Villamil (1991) for criticisms of the models on this dimension] or the ex-
istence of bonds bearing extraneously randomized returns. Further, neither
model permits inside investments that compete with government bonds.
In the sequel we present a model that explains each of observations (i)-(v),
with particular attention paid to when randomized returns are desirable. Our
interest in this topic stems from several sets of historical observations which
we now describe. In the 18th century, England and France issued bonds
where, in exchange for a capital payment, an investor received a title to a
bond plus a lottery ticket for a drawing of additional bonds. The payoff from
a "winning ticket" often provided an annual income greater than the total
capital contributed. The capital contributed generally was not small, some-
times exceeding average per capita income [see Weir and Velde (1989)]. Thus,
we observe large denomination bonds for which the return is explicitly extra-
neously randomized. At this same time England and France also borrowed
heavily through the use of tontines, where a group of subscribers purchased
bonds with fixed payments divided among "survivors." With a large group of
subscribers, the government's payments displayed little randomness, but for
any individual the returns were random. Interestingly, these were not sim-
ple annuity schemes since subscribers could make the payment contingent
^The optimal policy has a "forced saving" aspect which each agent would like to undo.
This is prevented by restrictions on intermediation which agents view as liquidity con-
straints on borrowing.
'^Having liquidity constraints perceived by only a subset of agents is consistent with
empirical evidence on credit rationing [cf., Jappelli (1990)].
on the survival of someone other than themselves.^ The expected returns
on this type of liabihty were generally favorable [see Weir (1989)]. Finally,
during the American Revolution the Continental government attempted to
borrow, in Europe, through the use of so-called lottery bonds with randomly
determined returns [see Anderson (1982)]. This was viewed as a device for
making American debt instruments more attractive to European investors.®
The use of such debt instruments has often been viewed as puzzling be-
cause the necessity of paying a risk premium to compensate (presumably)
risk averse borrowers for randomized returns makes this an apparently expen-
sive way to borrow [see the discussion in Weir (1989)]. Furthermore, in the
episodes described, financial and insurance markets were at best weakly de-
veloped. Therefore, one might expect the government to be relatively better
able to bear risk than individuals, so the intentional introduction of extrinsic
uncertainty by governments merits explanation. Also, "lottery bonds" and
bonds with certain returns were often used simultaneously. Finally, in some of
the historical examples, bonds with randomized returns were intended to be
sold to relatively wealthy investors. This contrasts with the socio-economic
characteristics of participants in recent state sponsored lottery "games" [see
Clotfelter and Cook (1990)]. These observations merit explanation.
We develop a stationary, two-period lived overlapping generations model
^Weir and Velde (1989) describe one famous mechanism, the "thirty French girls," that
was very transparent. Lists of young girls from Genevan families with reputations for
longevity and who had survived smallpox were compiled for use as "nominees" (recall
that subscribers could make payments contingent on the survival of someone other than
themselves, but payment required proof of the nominees' survival). The most common
group size was thirty because administrative costs rose with the number of nominees and
the marginal reduction in "portfolio risk" became small after thirty.
^We defer discussion of World War II finance, the problem considered by Keynes, to
Section 5. Also, we note that bond returns are often randomized in practice by fixing
a nominal payment in the presence of stochastic inflation rates or by simple (partial)
defaults. Both of these randomization schemes can be explained by our analysis. However,
our primary interest is in understanding the explicit randomization schemes described in
the text, which were well understood by agents to be random and were voluntarily entered
into.
in which a government with a utilitarian social welfare function must finance a
fixed deficit of a given size. It does this by borrowing from two types of agents
that are identical in all respects but one: different agents have different access
to investment opportunities other than government bonds. This is intended
to capture a situation where wealthier investors have access to investment
opportunities not open to poorer investors, or where a government seeks
to borrow both at home and abroad, and foreign investors have investment
opportunities not open to domestic investors. We assume that agent type and
outside investment activity are private information. If agents did not have
differential access to outside investment opportunities the government would
raise revenue from all types equally. When the deficit is sufficiently large,
doing so drives agents with the best investment opportunities (say type 1
agents) out of the bond market. This, in turn, requires all revenue to be raised
from type 2 agents, which a utilitarian government regards as undesirable.
Thus the government raises as much revenue as it can from type 1 agents
without driving them out of the bond market, and this requires that type 1
agents be treated preferentially. However, when type is private information,
preferential treatment of type 1 agents creates an adverse selection problem,
and optimal government policy must address the problem of keeping type 1
agents in the bond market in the face of this problem.
Under conditions we describe, the government treats type 1 agents pref-
erentially by designing an asset for them with a randomized return. In con-
trast, the asset designed for type 2 agents has a lower expected (but certain)
return. Despite the fact that both agent types have identical preferences,
endowments, and equal access to the government's assets, the access of type
1 agents to an outside alternative allows them to partially insure against the
bad state of nature associated with the randomized return. Type 2 agents,
having no access to the outside alternative, prefer the certain return. The
solution to this problem also involves the use of a kind of price discrimina-
tion described by Bryant and Wallace (1984) or Villamil (1988), where (as in
Villamil) government liabilities are issued in minimum denominations, inter-
mediation is prohibited, and there are as many types of government bonds
(bearing different returns) as there are agent types. In addition, type 1
agents are treated preferentially because they have access to private invest-
ment opportunities. We show that this policy is constrained Pareto efficient
if absolute risk aversion decreases at a rapid enough rate, because it is then
the optimal way to keep type 1 agents in the bond market given the adverse
selection problem.
The result that bonds with extraneously randomized returns are con-
strained Pareto efficient can also be interpreted as asserting the desirability
of random taxation. Of course the potential desirability of random taxation
in the presence of an adverse selection problem has been previously pointed
out [for instance by Stiglitz (1982)]. In our analysis, however, where the focus
is on government bond sales, the government cannot compel participation.
This makes our analysis somewhat different from that in standard taxation
models. Interpreted in a taxation context, our model could be regarded as
one in which only market activities can be taxed, and high enough taxation
drives some agents into non-market (or "underground") activities. Thus, tax-
ation must not only raise sufficient revenue, it must be designed to prevent
exit from market activities. Note that the adverse selection problem arises
in this setting if and only if voluntary participation is a binding constraint.
Finally, we briefly relate our results to two other literatures. First, in our
model (non-optimal) extraneous uncertainty can be introduced by market
factors which allow sunspot equilibria to exist, as in Shell (1977), Azariadis
(1981), or Cass and Shell (1983). However, our focus is different; we describe
conditions under which the government will intentionally, and on welfare
grounds, inject extraneous uncertainty into allocations. Second, in adverse
selection models where agents have identical underlying preferences, it is
generally not the case that randomization of allocations is desirable [e.g., see
Prescott and Townsend (1984) or Arnott and Stiglitz (1988)]. In contrast, we
show that randomization is desirable in an environment where agents have
identical underlying preferences and endowments, because different agent
"types" have differential access to outside opportunities. We return to the
relationship between our work and these literatures in the final section.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 considers non-stochastic planning problems from which
Pareto efficient consumption allocations can be derived under three alterna-
tive sets of assumptions about the constraints faced by the planner. Section
4 establishes conditions under which randomized allocations are desirable.
In both Sections 3 and 4 we describe how the government can decentralize
the optimal allocations. Section 5 relates our analysis to the problem posed
by Keynes (1940), while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete time economy populated by an infinite sequence of two-
period lived, overlapping generations and an infinitely lived government.
Each generation is identical in size and composition, containing a contin-
uum of agents with unit mass. Within each generation there are two types
of agents, indexed by i = 1,2. Let Oi denote the fraction of type i agents in
each generation, with ^, > and 9i + 02 = I. In addition, there is a single
consumption good at each date. All agents have endowment Wj of the good
in period j = 1, 2 of their life, with Wj > 0.
Agent types are differentiated by their access to a storage technology.
Type 1 (and only type 1) agents have access to a constant returns to scale
technology for storing the good, where one unit stored at time t returns
X E (0, 1) units at time t + I. Assume that each agent can store only his or
her own good, that agent type is private information (ex- ante), and that the
activity of storing the good (or the quantity stored) is unobservable.
All agents have identical preferences, representable by the additively sep-
arable utility function u{c[) + i;(c2), where c^ G M+ denotes the consumption
of a type i agent at age j. Assume that u and v are strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and thrice continuously differentiable, and define R{c) = —
-^t^^ to
be the coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Finally, let the government have
an exogenously given real per capita expenditure level of ^ > each period.
Assume that agents derive no utility from this expenditure.^
The assumption that type 1 agents can store the good while type 2 agents
cannot is meant to capture the problem facing a government which has a
deficit to finance, and must borrow from a set of heterogeneous agents with
differential access to alternative investment opportunities. The access of
some agents to relatively high return investments limits the ability of the
government to extract resources from them. In the model, the ability of type
1 agents to store the good gives them access to an asset not available to type
2 agents, which is the simplest form this problem can take. It proxies for sev-
eral different scenarios. For example, one might imagine that wealthier agents
have access to investment opportunities not available to poorer agents.^ Al-
ternatively, it could represent the situation of a domestic government which
seeks to borrow from foreign investors, who have investment options (bear-
ing the gross rate of return x) not available to domestic investors.^ Finally,
we note that our model has an interpretation as an economy in which di-
rect taxation is employed, but only "market activities" can be taxed. In
this case the differential access to the storage technology proxies for different
"non-market" opportunities.
For future reference, it will be useful to have a notation for the savings
^Or, government expenditure could affect utility in an additively separable way.
'^This is the problem considered by Keynes (1940), which is discussed further in Sec-
tion 5. Formally, we could let type i agents have an age j endowment of it;!, with wl > wf,
which resembles the model of Villamil (1988). However, this formulation complicates the
analysis without adding additional substantive issues. Therefore, we do not pursue it here.
^This would represent the problem facing the American government during the Revo-
lution when it contemplated selling lottery bonds in Europe.
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behavior of an agent who pays a lump-sum tax of r, at age j, and faces a
certain gross rate of return on savings of r. Such an agent chooses a savings
level, q, to maximize u{wi — Ti — q) + v{w2 — T2 + rq) subject to non-negativity
constraints. The solution to this problem is given by the savings function
q = f{wi — Ti^W2 — T2,r). Under our assumptions, and assuming interiority,
/i > > /2. Also, we assume that
Wi > f(wi,W2,x) > 0. («-l)
Finally, we define the indirect utility function V in the standard way:
V(wi - Ti,W2 - T2,r) = u{Wi - Ti - /(•)) -}- v{w2 - Tj + r/(-)).
3 Non-random Pareto Efficient Allocations
This section describes the allocations which solve a utilitarian social welfare
maximization problem under three alternative sets of assumptions about con-
straints faced by a social planner. It then considers how these allocations can
be decentralized by a government which sells bonds competitively, but can
impose legal restrictions on bond trades. Under each set of assumptions
about the constraints, we comment on which of observation (i) through (v)
are captured by the analysis. Finally, in this section attention is restricted
to non-random consumption allocations.
3.1 Full Information
As a benchmark, we begin by considering the problem of a social planner un-
der full information; that is, we assume that the planner knows each agent's
type, and can observe and (if desired) prohibit storage of the good. The plan-
ner's objective is to find a stationary allocation that maximizes an equally
weighted sum of the agents' utilities subject to a resource feasibihty con-
straint. Let k denote the amount of storage by a type 1 agent. Then the full
information Pareto problem can be written as follows:
9





Y,e^(c^^ 4- 4) + ^1^' < ^^1 +W2-g + Oixk. (1)
At an interior optimum, the solution to this problem sets
u'(c\) = i;'(4), (2)
for i = 1,2, Cj = c^, for j = 1,2, and k = 0. Notice that, from equations (1)
and (2), c\ = wi - f{wi,W2 - g,l), and 4 = W2 - g + f{wi,W2 - gA)- Thus
the utility of agents under this allocation is given by V{wi, W2 — ^, 1).
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem 3.1 is identical to
that obtained by Bryant and Wallace (1984), and can be decentralized as they
describe. In particular, the government can prohibit goods storage, sell bonds
with a minimum real value of F and a rate of return r, and prohibit agents
from "sharing" (or intermediating) bonds. If F and r are chosen to satisfy
F = f{wi^W2 — g, 1) and r = —^, then each agent will voluntarily purchase
bonds with a minimum real value of F [when y(it;i,Zi'2—5', 1) > ^(^1,^2,0)].
This policy permits the government to raise enough revenue to cover its
expenditure.
This arrangement has the feature that the government sells indivisible,
large denomination bonds. In addition, each agent saves more than he or she
would prefer at the going rate of return in a market without restrictions on
intermediation. Specifically, all individuals would like to borrow against the
future income from their investments (to consume more now), but are pre-
cluded from doing so by legal restrictions. Thus, contrary to observation (u ),
all agents perceive themselves as liquidity constrained. In other words, this
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model [which is simply Bryant and Wallace (1984)] captures the observation
that governments sell large denomination bonds and restrict intermediation
(i.e., observation [i] and (ii)), but it captures none of the other observations
listed in the Introduction.
3.2 Voluntary Participation
We now assume that the planner is subject to a voluntary participation
constraint, or in other words, that the planner cannot prevent type 1 agents
from autarchically storing the good or type 2 agents from consuming their
endowments. This represents the situation of a government that must finance
a deficit g by selling bonds, where the government is unable to compel bond
purchases. Alternatively, we may view this as the situation of a government
that cannot tax activities in an "underground"' economy. We continue to
assume that the government observes agents' types directly.
The planner now solves the problem
Problem 3.2. For i = 1,2, choose c\, c\, and k to maximize:
subject to: (1) and
u{c\) + v{cl)>V{wi,W2,x); (3)
u{cl) + v{cl) > u{wi) + v{w2). (4)
There are three possibilities regarding the solution to Problem 3.2.
Case 1: V{wi,W2 — g,l) > V{wi,W2,x). In this case constraints (3) and
(4) do not bind. This occurs, obviously, if g is sufficiently small, in which
case the solution to Problem 3.2 is the same as the solution to Problem 3.1.
Case 2: V{wi,W2 — gA) < u{wi) + v{w2). In this case the constraint
set is empty. We henceforth abstract from this possibility, which occurs if g
is too large.
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Case 3: V{wi,W2,x) > V{wi,W2 — g,'^) > u{wi) -^ v{w2). In this
case constraint (3) binds. This is the situation of interest to us and we
therefore focus exclusively on it. The solution satisfies constraints (1) and
(3) as equalities, (2), and c] > cj, for j = 1,2. In addition, k = 0. Thus, due
to the government's inability to compel agents to purchase its bonds, type
1 agents must be given incentives not to withdraw from the bond market.
Consequently, type 1 agents receive better terms than type 2 agents. Notice,
however, that since (2) holds, no inefficiencies result.
^°
Remark. The allocation given by the solution to Problem 3.2 can be decen-
tralized by the following government policy. Bonds are sold to type i agents
with a minimum real value of F^ and a corresponding gross rate of return
r\ Then F^ = wi — c\ and r' = ^^~,^^ hold. Type 2 agents are prohibited
from buying type 1 bonds, and intermediation is prohibited ex cathedra. Ar-
guments following those of Bryant and Wallace (1984) establish that type i
agents voluntarily purchase F' units of bonds of type i. It is easy to verify
that this permits the government to raise revenues equal to its expenditures.
This arrangement has all of the features of the problem in Section 3.1.
Relative to the former arrangement, however, it indicates that the govern-
ment now issues many types of bonds bearing alternative rates of return.
However, there is still no diversification of individuals' portfolios.
3.3 Voluntary Participation and Private Information
We next consider the problem of a planner who wishes to choose non-stochastic
Pareto efficient consumption allocations but cannot compel market partici-
pation, and in addition, cannot directly observe the type of any agent. Thus,
the planner is subject to incentive compatibihty constraints, as well as the
other constraints specified previously.
The planner now solves the problem
^°This corresponds to first degree price discrimination (or lump sum taxation).
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Problem 3.3. For z = 1,2, choose c\, C2 and k to maximize
x:^.wci)+^(4)]
t=i
subject to: (1), (3), (4), and the self-selection constraints
u(c\) + v(cl) > u{cl) ^ v(cly, (5)
u{cl) + v(cl) > u(cl + k) + v(cl - xk). (6)
Equation (5) imposes that type 1 agents (weakly) prefer (c},C2) to (c\^c\)}^
Equation (6) imposes incentive compatibility for type 2 agents, since a type
2 agent taking a type 1 allocation is not able to mimic the storage of a type
1 agent. Thus such an agent consumes c\-\- k when young, and c\ — xk (i.e.,
c\ less the proceeds of storage) when old.
The solutions to Problem 3.3 are of two general types.
Case 1: V[w\,W2—g,l)'>V(wi,W2,x). In this case the allocation from
Problem 3.1 satisfies conditions (3) through (6), since c] = c^, for j = 1,2.
Case 2: V{'W\^W2^x) > V{wi^W2—g,\)' In this case the allocation from
Problem 3.2 clearly is not incentive compatible, since cj > c^, for j = 1,2,
and A: = 0. In particular, since there is no goods storage and type 1 agents
are "better treated" than type 2 agents, all type 2 agents will claim to be
of type 1. We now focus on this case. It is clear that if (3) holds with
equality, then (5) will be satisfied. Hence (1), (3), and (6) are the binding
constraints in Problem 3.3. Moreover, the constraint set will be non-empty
if, for instance, V[wi^W2 — ^,1) > u{yoi) -f ^'(^2) holds.
We now characterize the solution to Problem 3.3.
Proposition 1. The solution to Problem 3.3 satisfies (1), (3), and (6) at
equality. In addition, it has u'{c\) = xv'{c\), u'{cl) = v'{cl), and k > 0.
^^Formally, constraint (5) should be written as u{c\) -\- v{c2) > V{cl,C2,x). However,
since u'{cl) = ^'(cj) > xv'{cl) holds (see below), V(q,c5,x) = uicl) + v{cl).
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1. The solution to Problem 3.3 has at least two interesting features.
First, as Appendix A shows, goods storage occurs. This is necessary to give
type 1 agents a utility level of V{wi,W2,x) without having type 2 agents
mimic their bond purchases. Second, since u'(c}) = xv'{cl), type 1 agents
are "on their savings functions'' with respect to storage of the good. Both
of these features reflect inefficiencies due to the necessity of treating type 1
agents preferentially in the presence of private information.
Remark 2. The solution to Problem 3.3 can be decentralized as follows.
The government issues two types of bonds, and prevents agents from sharing
them. Agents who buy type 1 bonds can buy only type 1 bonds, and are
permitted to purchase at most F units (in real terms). These bonds earn
the gross return r^. Agents who purchase type 2 bonds must purchase at
least F^ units (in real terms), and these bonds earn the gross return r^. The
2
government chooses F^ and r^ to satisfy F^ = Wi — c\ and r^ = ^'^Z^^ . The
government chooses F and r^ to satisfy
c} = wi - f{wi - F, W2 + r^F,x)\ (7)
c\ = W2 + r^F + xf{w^ - F, W2 + r^F, x). (8)
Then by (7) and (8), type 1 agents are "on their savings functions." Type
2 agents optimally purchase F^ units of type 2 bonds, and the government
raises revenue with a per capita value of g.
Remark 3. This arrangement captures observations [i) and [ii). In addi-
tion, it has the feature that type 1 agents hold diversified portfolios, since
they store goods and hold government bonds. Moreover, type 1 agents are
"on their savings functions,"' and hence do not perceive themselves to be
"liquidity constrained." Type 2 agents do, since u'{c\) = v'[c\) > r'^v'{cl).
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Thus, this context explains why government imposed legal restrictions lead
some, but not all, agents' to perceive themselves to be liquidity constrained.
The only remaining observation to be confronted then, is that governments
sometimes simultaneously issue bonds with randomized returns and bonds
with non-randomized returns [observation {iv)].
4 Stochastic Pareto Efficient Allocations
We now state conditions under which extrinsic randomization can be Pareto
improving. We begin by introducing some notation, and then consider a
constrained social planning problem that permits extraneous uncertainty.
Our objective is only to show that some extrinsic randomization is desirable,
so we proceed as follows. We assume that the planner chooses, for i =
1,2, deterministic values c\ for young consumption, and values £2(5) for old
consumption that may depend on an extraneous state s. For simplicity we
let s E {1,2}, and let p G (0,1) be the exogenous probability (which is
the same in all periods) that s = l.^'^ We assume that realizations of s are
independently and identically distributed across agents, and that s is realized
at the beginning of old age. This is meant to capture the features of several
historical randomization devices employed in government borrowing. As we
noted in the Introduction, historical evidence indicates that governments
have confronted individuals with random returns on some bonds, while the
government faced little or no (as here) randomness with respect to interest
obligations on these bonds.
We now consider the planning problem from which constrained, Pareto
efficient (possibly stochastic) consumption allocations are chosen. To simplify
notation, we will sometimes write Esh{c2{s)) = ph{c2(l)) + (1 — p)h(c2{2)),
where h(-) is an arbitrary function, and E denotes the expectation operator.
^^While our description treats p as exogenous, clearly randomization can be no less
desirable on welfare grounds if the government is free to choose p.
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The stochastic Pareto problem can be written as follows.
Problem 4.1. Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, 02(3), and k to maximize
i=l
subject to:
Y,e,[c\ + ^,4(5)] + ^!^ <u;i ^W2-g + eixk] (9)
»=i
u{c\) + EAc\{s)) > V{w,,W2, x); (10)
u{cl) + Esv{cl{s)) > u(c\ + k) + EXc]{s) - xk)- (11)
u(c\) + Esv(c\{s)) > u{cl) + Esv{cl(s)); (12)
u(cl) + EMclis)) > u{w,) + v{w2). (13)
Equation (9) is the resource feasibihty constraint, which reflects the fact
that there is no aggregate randomness. Equations (11) and (12) are the
self-selection constraints, and equations (10) and (13) are the voluntary par-
ticipation constraints.
Clearly the solution to Problem 4.1 coincides with the solution to Prob-
lem 3.1 unless (10) is binding. When (10) binds, so does (11), as in the
previous section. In this case, (12) cannot bind, and we restrict attention to
the case in which (13) does not bind. Thus, for the remainder of the section,
constraints (9) through (11) bind. It is easy to verify in this case that the
solution to Problem 4.1 has c^(l) = cl{2), so that only (or at most) type 1
agents face extrinsic uncertainty. This captures the observation that histor-
ically governments with large deficits have made use of lottery bonds with
attractive return distributions that are sold to agents who (presumably) have
reasonable alternative investment opportunities. Also, it is easy to check that
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the solution to Problem 4.1 has u'(cl) = v'{cl). Finally, arguments identical
to those in Appendix A can be used to establish that ^^ > holds, and that
u'{c\) = xEsv'{cl{s)). (14)
Thus, type 1 agents are "on their savings functions," as before.
4.1 Welfare Improving Randomization
We now state a sufficient condition for cl{l) / cl{2) to hold, so that type 1
agents face extraneous uncertainty.
Proposition 2. Suppose that —
,i-~^ Is u-i i\ > —~irH holds, where c\,
c\, and k are solutions to Problem 3.3. Then cl{l) ^ c\{2).
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the remainder of this section, we provide necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the inequality in Proposition 2 to hold. We then interpret our result.
In particular, we find that when the elasticity of absolute risk aversion with
respect to old age consumption is sufficiently large, extrinsic randomization
is welfare improving.
The inequality in Proposition 2 can be rewritten
R{c\ — xk){l — x)v'{cl — xk) J
v'{c\ - xk) - u'{c\ + k)
> R(c\). (15)
v'(c\-xk)
Note that ,,., " ^^ ^,;.,—r- < 7^, so a necessarv condition for (15) to hold is
v'{c\-xk)-u'(c\-\-k) 1-x' " ^ '
decreasing absolute risk aversion (with respect to old age consumption). We
now derive a sufficient condition for (15) to hold.
Define the function G by
^(^-^^'^^ =
v'[c\ - Xk) - u'(c\ + k) -
^^''^- ^'^^
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Since {c\^c\) satisfies u'{c\) = xv'{c]), it follows that G{c\,cl,0) = 0. More-
over, u{c\) + v{cl) = V{wi^W2^x) holds, so that {cl^c\) is completely deter-
mined and independent of k. Thus, G is effectively a function of k alone, and
if G3{c\,cl,k) > for all k > 0, G(c\,cl,k) > will hold. This, of course, is
exactly (15).
Straightforward differentiation of (16) establishes that G3 > iff
xR'(cl - xk) . u'{c\ + k)
,
R(c\ - xk) ' v'{c\ -xk)- u'(c\ + k)
{5|±|f-.i?(a^-.^-)}. (17)
Since xv'[c\ — xk) > u'{c\ + k) for all A; > 0, a sufficient condition for
^3(0}, C2, k) > 0, for all k > 0, is
An alternative statement of (18) is obtained by multiplying both sides by




—^i TT-'^ -} > ^^(^2 - ^k){c2 - xk)-
c\-xk u"{c\^k){c\ + k)
Equation (18') provides the result. It asserts that G2,{c\^c\^k) > for all
A: > if the elasticity of absolute risk aversion [with respect to old age
consumption, ^7
"^
], is sufficiently large. Note that R'(-) < if the utility
function exhibits everywhere strictly decreasing absolute risk aversion. ^^
^^Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that in a choice between a safe and a risky
asset, the risky asset is a normal good. This is a common assumption about preferences.
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4.2 A Special Case
ci-"We now consider the special case in which u{ci) = (l>-fz~ ^^^ ^{^2) = 'fz'i
with (f>> X and /? > 0. Then —^^7^ = 1 for all c. In addition, u'(c\) = xv'{cl)
imphes that c\ = c\{^y^^ < c\, and consequently, that cl— xk < (c\ + k)(^y^^
for all k >0. In this case (18') reduces to
{c\ — xk)l-^>^P + p'-i^rTlT- (19)
for all k > 0, which of course holds if
X\-x>xp + p(-)'/'. (20)
Thus Gz{c\,c\,k) > for all ^^ > holds if p is sufficiently small. This, in
turn, imphes that the inequality in Proposition 2 holds, and that random-
ization is desirable on welfare grounds.
4.3 Decentralizing the Optimal Stochastic Allocation
We must slightly augment our notation from Section 2 in order to describe
how to decentralize the optimal stochastic allocation. Consider the savings
problem of a young agent who faces a random lump-sum tax of T2{s) when old,
5 = 1,2, where the probability that s = 1 is p, and who faces a deterministic
gross rate of return r. This agent's problem is to choose a savings level q to
maximize u(wi — Ti — q) -\- pv(w2 — T2{1) + rq) + {I —p)v{w2 — T2{2) + rq). The
solution to the problem is a savings function q = f{wi — Ti,W2 — T2{1),W2 —
r2(2),r;p).
The optimal random consumption allocation can be supported by the
following policy. The government sells two types of bonds, and imposes
restrictions which prohibit agents from sharing bonds. The bonds sold to type
2 agents are sold in a minimum denomination of F and bear a deterministic
return r. The government chooses F and r to satisfy cl = Wi — F and
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c^ = W2 + rF. The bonds sold to type 1 agents are sold only in the indivisible
amount F, and bear a gross return r(l) with probability p, and r(2) with
probability I — p. The government chooses F, r(l), and r(2) to satisfy
cl = w,- f[w, - F, W2 + r(l)F, W2 + r(2)F, x; p]; (21)
4(1) = 1.^2 + r(l)^ + -r/(-); (22)
4(2) = u;2 + r(2)F + x/(.). (23)
This construction works since, by (14), type 1 agents are "on their savings
functions."
This decentralization scheme yields all of the observations listed in the
Introduction. Bonds are sold in many indivisible denominations with alter-
native rates of return, and intermediation of bonds is restricted. There is
individual portfolio diversification by type 1 agents, who store the good and
hold government bonds. Moreover, these agents do not perceive liquidity
constraints, while type 2 agents do. Finally, the government simultaneously
issues bonds with randomized returns and bonds with certain returns.
5 Some Notes on a Problem of Keynes
As mentioned at the outset, the problem we address bears a strong resem-
blance to that posed by Keynes (1940). Writing at the beginning of World
War II, Keynes argued that it was not desirable (and possibly not feasible)
to finance large wartime government expenditures without running a deficit.
He also argued that simple monetization of the deficit (without legal restric-
tions) would result in an inflation tax which would be inefficient. Moreover,
he concluded that the inflation tax could largely be evaded by the "entre-
preneur class" (p. 29), which had access to real assets. Hence, the burden of
the tax would fall entirely on the poor (whose access to assets was limited).
The problem, then, was how to finance the deficit in a way that would be
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least burdensome to the poor, given that there was a limit to the amount of
resources that could be raised from the wealthy.
The solution Keynes proposed was a "forced savings program," in which
agents were obligated to buy bonds. Interestingly, he also proposed a stochas-
tic element to repayment, which was that repayment of the debt would begin
in the first postwar cyclical downturn.^"* Thus, the timing of repayment was
clearly random from the point of view of bondholders. Sargent (1987) de-
scribes the analysis of Bryant and Wallace (1984) as a solution to Keynes'
problem. However, they consider an economy with no heterogeneity, so they
show only that a forced savings program can reduce the inefficiency of an
inflation tax.^^ However, they do not address the problem of the distribution
of the burden associated with deficit finance [i.e., the classic vertical equity
or "ability to pay" problem in public finance]. This was Keynes' primary in-
terest, and in fact he explicitly argued that, in the absence of heterogeneity,
the problem would be trivial, and could be solved by rationing (p. 52).
We explicitly confront Keynes' problem, in that our model has two "classes,"
one of whom has access to real investments not available to the other. We
then are able to show that the solution to the problem is to institute a forced
savings program, where the quantity of forced savings differs for different
groups. Further, we show that randomization of returns is a desirable aspect
of such a scheme under plausible conditions.
6 Conclusions
We have described an environment in which a government must finance a
fixed deficit of a given size. When some agents have access to investment
^'^Obviously, Keynes intended that this would be an expansionary policy measure.
^^Specifically, the government reduces the inefficiency of the tax by issuing bonds with a
higher yield (than currency) and by imposing a set of legal restrictions that cause "forced
savings" and thereby expand the tax base.
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opportunities other than government bonds, government borrowing is con-
strained by the desirability of keeping these agents in the bond market. How-
ever, treating some agents preferentially creates an adverse selection problem.
The optimal solution to these two problems involves price discrimination by
the government, and may involve the simultaneous use of bonds with ran-
dom and non-random returns. Interestingly, agents with the best outside
investment opportunities purchase bonds with random returns, and extrane-
ous randomization of bond returns is observed only when the government's
revenue needs are sufficiently large. These two features accord well with the
historical observations cited in the Introduction. This borrowing mechanism
can also be interpreted as one in which inflation is random and both in-
dexed and non-indexed government bonds co-exist, or as one where there is
a hierarchy of claims against the government, and bonds bearing high ex-
pected returns are subject to some risk of partial default. Thus the model
can confront a number of ways in which governments borrow using bonds
with random returns.
The following features of our model, and their relationship with recent
research on randomization, are of some interest. First, in our model random-
ization is desirable even though agents have the same underlying utility func-
tions and endowments. This contrasts with the results in Prescott-Townsend
(1984) and Arnott-Stiglitz (1988), and is due to the fact that agents have
access to (and make differential use of) different non-market activities. Thus
agents' indirect utility functions differ in such a way that randomized al-
locations may be desirable. This insight is essentially the same as that in
Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1990). Second, a type of randomization
consistent with the predictions of our model has been observed historically.
This is of interest because Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) (among others) note
that it is puzzling that randomization of contracts does not occur as fre-
quently as theory suggests. The analysis of government debt contracts in
our model may provide some insight into this puzzle,
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Arnott and Stiglitz discuss six reasons why randomization might not be
observed: (1) agents do not understand that randomization is optimal (i.e.,
they are only boundedly rational); (2) contracts involving randomization are
costly to enforce; (3) secondary markets or randomization insurance neu-
tralize the effects of randomization; (4) lotteries are viewed as unfair; (5)
von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility theory is deficient; and (6) indi-
viduals do not trust randomization mechanisms. Our theory and historical
observations suggest that (1), (2), (5), and (6) are not persuasive. We also
regard (4) as unpersuasive because randomization of the type that we de-
scribe (i.e., weakening the voluntary participation constraint by treating type
I's preferentially rather than imposing randomization on the relatively dis-
advantaged type 2's) need not be perceived as unfair by either group. ^^ In
contrast, (3) may be an important reason that randomization (even of the
type we describe) has been only periodic throughout history.^'
Because the bond policy that we describe is a form of price discrimination,
the existence of secondary markets would render the government unable to
implement its program. That is, implementation of the constrained Pareto
efficient bond policy that we study requires the government to impose le-
gal restrictions that prohibit the intermediation of bonds with randomized
returns. It is interesting to note that poorly developed financial markets
are common in many high inflation countries that choose to monetize their
deficits. For simplicity, we assume an ex cathedra prohibition against the
intermediation of assets. However, Bencivenga and Smith (1991) study the
optimal degree of financial repression in a developing economy faced with a
sustained deficit that must be monetized. They find that a gov^ernment with
a deficit (that is either unwilling or unable to decrease spending or increase
^^For example, if bonds with randomized returns were sold to foreign investors, it is
unlikely that domestic investors would view the implicit taxation of foreign investors as
unfair.
^^Of course the size of g and x (see the restrictions associated with case 2 in Section 4
that make this policy optimal) also vary over the course of an economy's business cycle.
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explicit taxes) may be required by simple feasibility to engage in financial re-
pression to support its monetization program. Such repression is much more
difficult in more developed countries and may be one reason why "lottery
bonds" have not been observed in well developed financial markets.
Finally, another reason that the type of randomization policy we study
has been observed only periodically throughout history may be related to the
question of whether the policy supports a unique stationary equihbrium. An
open question is whether the method of decentralization that we describe,
based on Bryant and Wallace (1984), also supports other equihbria. While
this must remain a topic for future research, Cooley and Smith (1990) have
shown that the decentralization scheme in the Bryant and Wallace model can
result in indeterminacies. In addition, the kinds of government borrowing
schemes we describe may easily permit stationary sunspot equifibria, such as
those described by Shell (1977), Azariadis (1981), and Cass and Shell (1983)
[see Smith (1989) for a suggestive example along these lines]. Thus the market
might add extraneous uncertainty to that already created by the government.
These possibilities raise an interesting question for future research—how well
can the government do, in a welfare sense, if it is constrained to schemes that
have a unique (or a unique stationary) equiUbrium?
7 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
We first restate Problem 3.3 with only the binding constraints displayed.




u{c\) + v(cl) > V{wi,W2, x) {A.2)
u{cl) + v(cl) > w(cj + k) + v(cl - xk). (A.3)
Proof of Proposition 1. Let A^^ > be the Lagrange multiplier associated
with constraint (A.n), and observe the following.
At interior solutions for c\ and c\^ the relevant first order conditions are
u'(c\){e^ + A2) - \:,u\c\ + k) = 0,X,. (AA)
v'(cl)(ei + A2) - Xsv'ic] - xk) = 6'iAi. (A.5)
The first order condition for k is
Xslv'ic] - xk)x - u'{c\ + k)] - Ai6li(l - x) < 0, (AS)
with equality li k > 0.
Finally, the first order conditions for Cj and c^ at an interior optimum are
w'(c?)(^2 + A3) = Mi. {A.l)
v'{cl)(e, + A3) = e,\,. (A.8)
Of course (A.l) and (A.8) imply that u'(c\) = v'(cl).
Now multiply both sides of (A.5) by x, subtract the result from (AA),
and use (^4.6) to eliminate ^iAi(l — x) to obtain
(e,^X2)[xv'(cl)-u'(c\)]<0, (A.9)
with equality if A: > 0.
Clearly, if we establish that k > the proof is complete. Thus, suppose by
way of contradiction that A: = 0. Then (AA) and (A.5) imply that u'(c\) =
v'(cl). Since (A.2) is binding, it follows that c] > c|, for j = 1,2. But then
(A.3) is violated, giving the desired result. This proves Proposition 1.
25
8 Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
We begin by considering the following augmented version of Problem 4.1.
Problem 4.1': Fori = 1,2 and s = 1,2, choose c\, C2{s), and k to maximize
t=i
subject to: (9) through (11) and
u'{cl) = xpv'(c](l)) + x(l - p)v'(cl{2)). (B.l)
Since the solution to Problem 4.1 satisfies (B.l), imposition of this constraint
does not alter the optimal choices for the social planner.
Equations (9) through (11), which hold as equalities, and (B.l) constitute
four equations involving cj, c\{l), cl{2), k, c^, and c^ [since cl{l) = C2(2) =
cl]. We now use (9), (11), and {B.l) to eliminate cj, c\{l)^ and k from
Problem 4.1'.
First, let [B.l) define c\ as a function of cl{l) and c\{2). In particu-
lar, define c\ = a{cl{l) , cl{2)) . Clearly, c\ = a{cl^cl) holds. In addition,
differentiation of [B.l] yields
ai(4(l), 4(2)) = px
'^Yfl^^ > 0- (^-2)
v"(r^(2))
a.(4(l),4(2)) = (l-p)x^;;fji^>0. (B.3)
U [Cij
Second, substitute c\ = a{cl{l) , c\{2)) into (9) at equality. This gives k
as a function of
€2(1), C2(2), Cj, and c^. Thus define k = ^{c\{l), cl{2); c^, cl).
Observe that k = l3{c\,c\\ cl^cl) holds, and that differentiation of /?(•) yields:
A = -(HL±Z)<o. (BA)
I — X
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/J, = -i^l±l^) < 0. (B.5)
i — X
Third, substitute c\ = a(cl{l)^c\{2)) and k = /?(•) into (11) at equality.
This defines c\(2) as a function of
€2(1), cj, and Cj; say c\{2) = 7(02(1); cf^cl).
As before c], = 'y{cl:,cl^cl). Moreover, differentiation of 7(-) yields
y,{cl;clcl) = --^-. {B.6)l-p
Finally, define the function 6{-) as follows
5(4(l);cJ,4) = u(a{cl(l),im + pv{cl(l)) + (1 - pH^{)). (B.7)
Observe that S{-) is the left-hand-side of constraint (10), the (binding) vol-
untary participation constraint for type 1 agents. The function S{-) expresses
the left-hand-side of this constraint solely as a function of c\{l) and c^, for
j = 1,2. The strategy of the remainder of the proof is to show that S{-) is
locally convex in
€2(1), so local randomization relaxes the voluntary partici-
pation constraint on type 1 agents and consequently is welfare improving.
Now observe that Problem 4.1' reduces to the foUowing:^^





€2(1) = cl at an optimum, then the solution to Problem 4.1" coincides
with the (non-stochastic) solution to Problem 3.3.
We now establish the following properties of 6(-):
S,idl;dldl) = 0^ (B.9)
^*This follows since u{c\) + pv{c\{l)) + {I - p)v{cl{2)) = V{wx,W2,x) holds.
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and if the inequality in Proposition 2 holds,
6u{cl;clcl)>0. (BAO)
Then setting 02(1) ^ c\ (i^ some neighborhood of c\) relaxes constraint (B.7)
in Problem 4.1". It follows that at an optimum, 02(1) ^ c\^ and consequently
€2(1) 7^ ^2(2)- Thus there will be extraneous randomization of the allocation
received by type 1 agents.
It remains, then, to establish that (B.9) and (B.IO) hold. For (B.9),
straightforward differentiation of (B.7) gives
b,(c\-rc\rcl) = u\a{-))[a, ^- a2l,]^ pv'[c\) + (I - p)v'[~c\)-i,. {B.ll)
Substitution of (B.2), (B.3), and (B.6) into (B.ll) gives (B.9)
For (B.IO), further differentiation yields
Sxi(c\]c\,cl) = ""(c})[cti + a27i]^ + w'(cJ)[Qii+Qi27i+a2i7i + a22(7i)^+Q;27ii]
^pv"{c]) + (1 - p)v"{cl)M' + (1 - p)v'{c]hu- (5.12)
It is straightforward but tedious to establish that, when evaluated at [cl, c^,
Q^ii + Q^i27i + c>f2i7i + a22(7i)^ + <^27ii =
Q^i{7ii + 7-^
—^H;?"^}' ^T3p {I - pr V [C2)
ai+Q27i = 0; (B.14)
and






Substituting (B.13) through (B.15) into (B.12) gives
c i~l ~2 -2\ P^"{^\) , XOtiv'{c\)v"'{c\) \ '(~\\ rii^^^il
^11(^2; c,.c,) = ^-- + (^_^^^.(-,^ + (1
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